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Abstract 
Using stakeholder theory, this article explores the motivations of charities in discharging 
accountability and the interplay of donor and beneficiary accountability needs. In particular, it 
considers the extent to which concentration on one group may disadvantage another, something 
suggested by theory. This research finds that stakeholders commonly perceived as more salient, 
such as donors, cede power and impute saliency to beneficiaries.  
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Introduction 
‘It was the best of times, 
It was the worst of times.’ 
 
A Tale of Two Cities 
Charles Dickens 
 
The UK-based Charity Commission (2004) interprets accountability mainly in terms of providing 
information to stakeholders that is impartial, comparable, understandable and focused on 
stakeholders’ needs. Given the sizeable funds provided to charities, combined with highly 
publicized scandals, the extent to which charities are accountable for how they spend this money 
has received considerable attention, with the need for transparency being widely articulated 
(Ebrahim, 2003a; Cordery and Baskerville; 2011; Ipsos Mori, 2012). The Charity Commission in 
England and Wales has been charged with enhancing charitable accountability, increasing public 
trust and promoting the effective use of charitable funds. In Scotland and Northern Ireland, 
recent regulatory changes have emphasized similar themes.  
 Mitchell et al. (1997) assert that the degree to which particular stakeholders’ accountability 
needs are prioritized depends on their ‘salience’, which is determined by their power, legitimacy 
and urgency. Developed in a corporate context, stakeholder salience suggests that stakeholders 
compete for attention, with greater attention to one resulting in less attention to another. Such a 
framework has application for charities, with key external stakeholders including beneficiaries and 
donors. Indeed, while meeting beneficiary interests is central to a charity’s mission, donors, as 
providers of funds, are powerful stakeholders.   
 This article considers whether concentrating on one stakeholder group may disadvantage 
another. In particular, it explores the motivations of charities in discharging accountability and 
the interplay of donor and beneficiary accountability needs. Key questions considered are: to 
whom is a charity accountable? and does a donor focus conflict with a beneficiary focus? While 
in a corporate context, focusing on discharging accountability to finance providers may be 
detrimental to other stakeholders, there is arguably less likelihood of this occurring in the charity 
sector because donors’ (providers of finance) interests may (or perhaps should) be closely aligned 
with those of beneficiaries. Notwithstanding this expectation, in various settings the potential for 
mission drift has been recognized, whereby, responding to the promptings of particularly 
influential or powerful stakeholders (or failing to focus on key aims), the charity can move away 
from its key mission (which is often linked to beneficiary focus) – see Bruce and Chew (2011), 
Considine et al. (2014) and Ebrahim et al. (2014). In this article, using empirical interview data, it is 
argued that stakeholders commonly perceived as salient (donors) cede power and credit saliency 
to beneficiaries to support their accountability needs. Thus, echoing the sentiments of some of 
the most famous opening lines of an English novel that introduce this section (lines from A Tale 
of Two Cities), a potential stakeholder paradox is recognized.  
 In terms of format, the next section reviews relevant accountability and stakeholder 
salience literature in order to consider how charity accountability might be constructed and 
discharged; this is used as a basis for interpreting the empirical work presented later. Then, the 
research method employed is outlined and the results presented. Finally, the results are discussed 
and conclusions drawn. 
 
Accountability and stakeholders 
What is charity accountability? 
Traditionally, accountability has been viewed from a reporting perspective whereby organizations, 
acting as agents, accounted to their principals (Laughlin, 1990; Ebrahim, 2003a). Accountability 
here is an externally motivated paradigm where principals oversee and control the agents’ 
activities and the latter seek to meet the standards of behaviour prescribed by the principals (Fry, 
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1995). Previous research has also considered accountability in the context of stakeholder theory 
(Hyndman and McMahon, 2011; Dhanani and Connolly, 2012), with a stakeholder being defined 
as a group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s 
objectives (Freeman, 2010). Here, the central argument is that if organizations openly engage 
with stakeholders, they will build legitimacy and reputation that will result in competitive 
advantage. This suggests that organizational survival and success require stakeholder support, and 
that management needs to legitimize organizational activities by demonstrating the organization’s 
values, beliefs and successes (Samkin and Schneider, 2010). Additionally, accountability has been 
examined in terms of the role and value of different accountability mechanisms (O’Dwyer and 
Unerman, 2007) and how it plays out in organizations (O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015), including 
taking responsibility for actions and behaviours (Ebrahim, 2003a).  
 
To whom and what motivates charity accountability? 
A number of studies have identified different stakeholders to whom a charity should account. 
These include donors, the accounting profession, regulators, beneficiaries, government and the 
public (Hyndman and McDonnell, 2009). This array of stakeholders presents charities with 
complex and often competing needs to meet (Codery and Baskerville, 2011). 
 Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder salience theory posits that once stakeholders are 
identified, organizations rank competing claims, with the most salient stakeholders being those 
perceived to have power, legitimacy and urgency. Power reflects the extent to which a 
stakeholder can impose its will on an organization, while urgency is the degree to which 
stakeholder claims require immediate attention due to their time-sensitivity or criticality. 
Legitimate stakeholders include those that contract with an organization as well as those with 
moral legitimacy, such as donors and beneficiaries. Stakeholders perceived as possessing all three 
attributes are deemed most salient (‘definitive stakeholders’, Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 878), with 
their needs likely to be prioritized. Those demonstrating fewer attributes have less salience. In a 
charity context, ‘large’ donors are often identified as the most salient because their funding 
ensures long-term organizational survival (Hyndman, 1990). In contrast, Cordery and Baskerville 
(2011) assert that while the donating public (‘small’ donors: donors of relatively small, but often 
regular, amounts) and beneficiaries may have moral rights/expectations, neither will exhibit high 
salience as they are bereft of power. Thus, consistent with the positive or managerial branch of 
stakeholder theory, charities may focus on being accountable to major donors at the expense of 
other stakeholders (raising the potential for mission drift). Although, as argued later, meeting 
these donors’ needs may not necessarily be detrimental to other stakeholders, including 
beneficiaries. 
 In a business context, Donaldson and Preston (1995) describe two distinct motivations 
(instrumental and normative) on why organizations do/do not take account of stakeholder needs. 
Their instrumental view, which echoes Mitchell et al.’s (1997) arguments, contends that 
businesses prioritize those stakeholders with the greatest economic power and influence to 
ensure their own success and survival. In comparison, the normative perspective affirms that 
individuals have a moral duty to consider each other’s needs and opinions. Thus, all stakeholders 
are honoured equitably and participation is promoted. In a nonprofit setting, and contrary to 
Mitchell et al.’s main thrust, Conforth (2003) argues that power differentials may be 
inconsequential and management genuinely may want and choose to account to and for its 
constituents (Lawry, 1995). 
 Albeit using different terminology, Roberts (1991) and Laughlin (1996) categorize 
accountability similarly to Donaldson and Preston (1995). Roberts’s hierarchical and Laughlin’s 
contractual accountability equate to Donaldson and Preston’s instrumental accountability, while 
their socializing and communal accountability respectively is aligned with normative forms. 
Instrumental/hierarchical/contractual accountability arguably exists in formal relationships, 
where action and information demand and supply are defined in enforceable terms. In contrast, 
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normative/socializing/communal accountability occurs in less formal relationships, where 
expectations over conduct and information demand and supply are less defined. If a charity’s 
practices are aligned with the normative model, its actions and discourse (for example, in its 
formal communications) will be characterized by openness and transparency in a desire to meet 
the (information) needs of all stakeholders equitably. As organizations often seeking a just 
society, charities might be expected to orient themselves with the normative model (Ebrahim, 
2003a); however, balancing external accountability (for example, to donors) and felt responsibility 
(for example, to beneficiaries) has the potential to create tension (Fry, 1995). 
 
What are the consequences of upward and downward accountability, and how is such accountability 
operationalized? 
The specific natures of instrumental and normative accountability mean that they may be 
discharged in different ways, depending on those involved. For example, although reports may be 
contractually required by ‘upward’ stakeholders (for example, grantmaking organizations), and 
feature prominently in the discharge of such accountability, normative accountability is more 
likely to be provided ‘downward’ (for example, to beneficiaries) in different forms (Broadbent et 
al., 1996). While formal reports (of perhaps a less technical nature than those required for 
‘upward’ accountability) and other communications may play a part in ‘downward’ accountability, 
features beyond merely providing information will possibly be most relevant (such as the quality 
and immediacy of service delivery, and ‘voice’ in terms of decision making). Charities can gain 
legitimacy from their upward stakeholders by communicating the financial probity and efficiency 
with which they operate and the positive impact that they have on those they serve (Ebrahim, 
2003b). However, while the discharge of accountability also enables charities to achieve 
legitimacy from their downward stakeholders, their limited power may encourage some 
organizations to be less focused on this (Assad and Goddard, 2006); although, the potential for 
mission drift may depend upon, among other things, the degree to which individual charities are 
strongly value-driven.  
 Reinforcing the normative model, ‘powerful’ donors may make beneficiary interaction a 
funding condition (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2010). Yet, Kilby (2006) contends that the 
effectiveness of downward accountability is not always evident and, while there may be benefits 
in engaging more closely with beneficiaries, such as more intensive focus on key goals and greater 
legitimation, this is difficult to achieve (Wellens and Jegers, 2011). For example, beneficiaries, 
even if easily identified, may not want to engage, or engagement may be challenging because of 
beneficiary-identification problems (such as in medical research and animal welfare charities) 
(Connolly and Hyndman, 2013).  
 In practice, upward and downward accountability may represent end-points on a 
spectrum of accountability positions. Interestingly, in a corporate context, Goodpaster’s (1991) 
stakeholder analysis contrasts with the instrumental view that privileges shareholders as providers 
of finance. He advocates a ‘multi-fiduciary’ stakeholder orientation that considers stakeholders 
beyond those having economic power and, while managers who pursue this approach may face 
resistance from those who believe that an instrumental orientation is the only ‘legitimate’ one for 
businesses, this Stakeholder Paradox is defended on ethical grounds. In a non-governmental 
organization context, O’Dwyer and Unerman (2007) explore a similar concept, holistic 
accountability, involving broader accountabilities, not just upward (to donors) and downward (to 
beneficiaries), but in multiple directions between different stakeholders. They argue that this is 
desirable from a practical perspective, as it helps ensure that donors and organizations are aware 
of the most effective ways to deploy finite funding, and from a moral perspective, as it helps 
discharge accountability derived from moral responsibilities.  
 Operationally, there are multiple accountability instruments (Ebrahim, 2003b). While 
accepting that public discourse instruments are only one means through which accountability is 
discharged (and that accountability is much wider than accounting, no matter how widely 
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‘accounting’ is defined), public discourse is nevertheless a key mechanism as it enables 
organizations to communicate with constituents and demonstrate that they are operating 
responsibly (Samkin and Schneider, 2010). Organizations can use discourse to shape stakeholder 
perceptions and expectations to ensure that organizational behaviours are (perceived to be) 
aligned with societal values. Public discourse mechanisms include the annual report (used here, 
for convenience, to refer to documents which comprise an organization’s annual financial 
statements plus any narrative reports by management – it may, as in the UK, be statutorily 
required) and other voluntary documents published for stakeholder consumption (for example, a 
less formal annual review). Supplementary accountability mechanisms (outside of merely the 
provision of information) include: participation, where organizations engage with (downward) 
constituents and involve them in decision making; and the adoption of standards and codes of 
conduct which articulate appropriate and accountable behaviour (Ebrahim, 2003b). In practice, 
accountability mechanisms operate connectedly. Codes of conduct may, for example, inform 
attempts to account through discourse, and simultaneously, the (self-imposed) pressures to 
account through discourse may encourage the adoption of specific standards.  
 The annual report is often viewed as the principal formal means through which 
management communicates with (often predominantly upward) stakeholders (Yuthas et al., 2002). 
It often occupies a prominent position as a statutory document (Gray et al., 2006; Samkin and 
Schneider, 2010), attracting a degree of authenticity not associated with other such organizational 
media (Coy et al., 2001). High-quality reports can lead to greater confidence in the 
organization/sector, and greater confidence can lead to increased legitimacy and funding 
(Laughlin, 1990; Connolly et al., 2013). Two types of information that are important in 
discharging accountability are financial information as contained in financial statements and wider 
performance (often non-financial) information, relating to the goals, objectives, efficiency and 
effectiveness of the organization. Prior research examining charity accounting and reporting in 
the UK can be categorized into studies that have investigated: the extent to which charity 
financial statements comply with accounting recommendations (Bird and Morgan-Jones, 1981; 
Connolly and Hyndman, 2001); and the disclosure of performance information (Hyndman, 1990; 
Jetty and Beattie, 2009).  
 
Research method 
This research investigates the motivations of charities in discharging accountability, and, in 
particular, explores a potential conflict between a focus on donors and a focus on beneficiaries. 
To operationalize this, a semi-structured interview guide, informed by the theoretical issues and 
empirical findings discussed above, was developed. Using charity contacts from prior research, 
individuals from four key stakeholder groups (charity auditors, beneficiaries, donors and 
managers) were contacted by the researchers, the background to the research explained and an 
interview requested. Given the difficulties of gaining access to interviewees from each group, the 
potential sensitivities of the matters being discussed and the researchers’ desire for the 
interviewees to be as candid as possible, each potential interviewee was informed (before agreeing 
to be interviewed) that the interviews would be reported in a manner where specific statements 
could not be attributed to particular individuals.  
 In total, the authors conducted 26 interviews, which ranged from one to two hours, and 
all interviewees allowed their interviews to be recorded, with notes also being taken. The tapes 
were transcribed immediately to ensure accuracy and comprehension, and Table I provides an 
analysis of the interviewees by stakeholder group. Giving each interviewee a unique reference 
(CA1-6, CB1-8, CD1-6 and CM1-6) allows the reader to identify comments from the same 
interviewee, while maintaining confidentiality. Each interviewee had substantial knowledge of 
some aspect of the sector. For example: each of the auditors had been engaged in charity audits 
for a number of years; six beneficiaries had used the services of more than one charity for at least 
15 years (the other two had used the services of one large national charity over a prolonged 
Pre-publication PMM 
7 
 
period); of the donors, three were individual donors (CD1, CD3 and CD5), two were grant 
makers (CD2 and CD4) and one a corporate donor (CD6); and each of the charity managers held 
a senior position in their respective charity.  
 
Table I: Interviewees 
 
Stakeholder group (and reference) Number interviewed 
Charity auditor (CA1-6) 6 
Charity beneficiary (CB1-8) 8 
Charity donor (CD1-6) 6 
Charity manager (CM1-6) 6 
 26 
 
The views of key stakeholders 
This section reports the views of key stakeholders concerning the issues related to charity 
accountability explored previously. 
 
What is charity accountability? 
While a broad view was that ‘accountability is about keeping people informed’ (CB8), most 
interviewees defined it as demonstrating that monies received had been spent in accordance with 
the charity’s aims and objectives. Charity auditors and managers especially linked accountability 
with stewardship.  
 
Accountability is stewardship isn’t it? Management is entrusted with looking after the assets of the 
organization. (CA4) 
 
I suspect that people want to know that if they are giving you their money, stewardship is strong and that it’s 
being spent in the way you said you were going to spend it. (CM5) 
 
This was often associated with implementing appropriate systems to record income and 
expenditure, particularly with respect to restricted funds, and to ensure compliance with the  
charity Statement of Recommended Practice (SORP) (which contains UK recommendations, or, 
especially with large charities, requirements, with respect to accounting practice.  
 
Accountability is about ensuring that monies are used for the purposes that the donors had intended. (CM3) 
 
To whom and what motivates charity accountability? 
Many interviewees acknowledged that charities are accountable to a variety of stakeholders.  
 
Charities have multiple and overlapping levels of accountability. They’re accountable to donors, government, 
members, beneficiaries and even to the community. (CD2) 
 
The competing demands of beneficiaries and donors dominated responses, although, 
beneficiaries themselves, while often acknowledging the importance of donors, emphasized their 
own claims.  
 
The individual in need should be at the centre of everything the charity does. (CB7) 
 
Notwithstanding the beneficiary view on their own position regarding accountability, 
auditor, donor and manager interviewees tended to deliberate between the primacy of donors and 
beneficiaries.  
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We are given money in trust because of what we do and therefore we are accountable in the first instance to 
those who give us the money and also to those whom we do work for. (CM5) 
 
While this might suggest a possible tension between donor and beneficiary needs, most 
advocated a beneficiary focus.  
 
Obviously you are accountable to the donors as to how you’ve utilized their money. But if we don’t focus on 
the service user [beneficiary] then we’ve lost our direction. (CM3) 
 
However, the consensus was that most beneficiaries have little interest in participating in 
the management or administration of the charity, possibly because of their motivation, capability 
or the urgency of their needs. Additionally, while beneficiary engagement may potentially 
improve charity reporting (and sharpen charity actions), and legitimate the accounting and 
reporting framework, this and other research (for example, Connolly et al., 2013) highlights the 
difficulties of achieving this. When asked how such engagement could be facilitated, the response 
was generally that even if encouraged, it was unlikely to happen because beneficiaries were 
primarily interested in service provision.  
 
The dilemma is that the happier the beneficiaries are with the service, the less likely they are to want to be 
involved. (CD2) 
 
There is an assumption that beneficiaries want to be involved in decision making, but I suspect an awful lot of 
them don’t. And why should they? All that matters is the service they are getting. (CM6) 
 
Accepting the difficulties of beneficiary engagement, it was suggested that donors ‘take a 
beneficiary-focused position’ (CA6). In addition, it was contended that concerns over tensions 
relating to potentially competing interests between these stakeholders should not be overstated, 
as meeting beneficiary needs is often synonymous with satisfying those of donors (which are 
typically related to beneficiary service provision). 
 
It’s a conundrum. I don’t know if there is a right answer…Probably should be beneficiaries [who are 
prioritized], but many beneficiaries are unable to articulate their needs or views. Maybe this means charities 
then focus on their donors. (CA6)  
 
How accountability actually manifests itself depends on who’s there to hold charities to account. It might be 
the regulator because beneficiaries can’t. Alternatively, donors can provide a good proxy because they act in the 
best interests of beneficiaries. (CD4) 
 
 Notwithstanding the acknowledged importance of beneficiaries, the vast majority of 
interviewees accepted that charities try to balance donors’ and beneficiaries’ interests. However, 
some, reflecting on current financial pressures in the sector (Charity Finance Group, 2012), or 
echoing aspects of Donaldson and Preston’s (1995) instrumental view, suggested that, despite a 
moral imperative to focus on beneficiaries, donors could, in certain circumstances, be given 
primacy.  
 
In theory, charities should be accountable firstly to their beneficiaries… Because of the way things are at the 
minute in terms of funding, the focus is on donors. (CA2) 
 
What are the consequences of upward and downward accountability and how is such accountability 
operationalized? 
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While beneficiary and small donor interviewees expressed little interest in detailed formal 
communications, frequently because such documents are perceived as difficult to understand, 
both groups were adamant that they expected charities to produce such information (for 
example, a SORP-compliant annual report) as public availability enables scrutiny by others. 
Beneficiaries particularly expressed a strong preference for regular ‘softer’ magazines and leaflets 
containing stories relating to the charity’s work.  
 
I know the accounts get done but I’m not that interested. I’d rather read about the members, the services and 
the different people that have been helped. (CB6) 
 
I like magazines, regular information with personal stories. I even use Facebook. (CB8) 
 
Such views reflect Laughlin’s (1996) communal accountability, which suggests that accountability 
can be less formal where there is trust and little potential for value conflict. 
 Small donor interviewees expressed limited desire to undertake detailed analyses of 
formal communications. Referring specifically to the annual report, and perceiving themselves as 
having limited power and influence, they relied on others to scrutinize such on their behalf (albeit 
no specifics on who this ‘someone else’ might be were indicated).   
 
I might thumb through it [annual report], but I’d never look at it in an analytical way. As long as 
someone else looks to see that they’re doing it right, I’m happy with that. (CD1) 
 
While good formal communications were considered necessary, small donors trusted the charities 
to which they contributed and assumed that others reviewed the information published. Giving 
decisions were often based upon the ‘cause’ and reputation of the charity rather than an in-depth 
analysis of accountability information. 
 
I’m a story person. What prompts me to continue giving is if I think ‘Yes, I like what they’re doing’. (CD3) 
 
 Large donor interviewees confirmed that while formal communications (such as SORP-
compliant annual reports) were expected, and were regularly used, they always required additional 
non-publicly available information and direct engagement before finalising funding (for example, 
management accounts and cash flow information, coupled with at least one organizational visit). 
In addition, regular reports (frequently including output information) relating to funded projects 
were also often required.  
 
Before we go to see the client, we’ll have a look at different published reports and the website. But we would 
never make a decision just on that basis. (CD6)  
 
 Interviewees were given the opportunity to indicate what information that is currently not 
provided should be included in formal communications. Most suggested that more narrative 
explanations clarifying the story behind the figures would benefit all stakeholders.  
 
Numbers don’t tell you what the charity is doing. I like to read the stories of what help people have received. 
Donors and the public should also want to see what beneficiaries are getting. (CB7) 
 
 Many interviewees also believed that greater disclosure of performance information 
would be a ‘good thing’ (CB5), with auditor and manager interviewees asserting that further 
performance information was often available internally than was published externally in the 
charities they had knowledge of (large charities), and surmised it was also available in smaller 
charities.  
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Most charities will have some measures of how they’re performing. It would be problematic if they didn’t. 
Even small charities will have information on the impact of whatever it is they’re doing. (CM2) 
 
While many interviewees agreed that performance information was crucial, difficulties in 
capturing and providing this were acknowledged. These included: finding reliable measures; 
confidentiality; and freeing staff resources to develop and monitor the measures.  
 
The donor gives you a pound, but can you tell the donor if it was spent effectively, probably not. All you can 
do is try to assess whether the service has achieved what it is meant to. But often that’s a matter of judgement, 
especially if it’s a long-term thing. (CM4) 
  
 With respect to ‘impact’, possibly the ultimate expression of performance, it was generally 
accepted that while this was vital in the context of accountability, for some charities it might only 
be measurable in the medium/long term. Charity managers in particular believed that reporting 
personal stories was a valid means of demonstrating ‘impact’.  
 
Stories of how we have helped are one way of illustrating impact, and it can help you plan your services 
accordingly. (CM4) 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
Given their public benefit purposes and the advantages of charitable status, accountability should 
be an intrinsic feature of not only the work that charities do, but also how they report their 
activities. External stakeholders have information needs, yet, because they normally have limited 
powers, they must rely primarily on charities to meet these. The actions of charities, together with 
the provision of financial and performance information (in addition to wider non-financial 
information), are important to external stakeholders as they make decisions relating to their 
engagement with, or funding of, the organization. In addition, the provision of information 
through formal channels, and its (potential for) scrutiny, provides a control on charity 
management to act in ways that meet stakeholders’ needs, especially beneficiaries and donors.  
 This research considers the motivations of charities in discharging accountability, and 
explores potential conflicts (particularly between the competing claims of donors and 
beneficiaries) and the outworking of these. While Goodpaster’s (1991) Stakeholder Paradox reflects 
the competing claims and objectives of different stakeholder groups in a business context, such 
tensions may not exist to the same extent in a charity setting. Indeed, if charity managers pursue 
an instrumental approach to the discharge of accountability by focusing on donors’ interests, this 
may, de facto, result in a multi-fiduciary orientation by default (as donors’ interests are likely to be 
aligned with those of beneficiaries). Moreover, if charities embrace a multi-fiduciary approach 
(and pay particular heed to the needs of beneficiaries), this should not alienate donors (and 
consequently threaten long-term organizational survival) because of the motives of donors. 
Managing paradox means embracing and exploring tensions and differences rather than choosing 
between them. Much of what makes responsible decision making difficult is understanding how 
there can be an ethical relationship between trustees/management and stakeholders that avoids 
being too weak (prioritizing donors) or too strong (prioritizing beneficiaries). While, in a 
corporate context, focusing upon finance providers may be detrimental to other stakeholders, 
this is perhaps much less likely in charities where there is close alignment between donors’ 
interests and beneficiary needs (notwithstanding the often present danger of mission drift – 
Bruce and Chew, 2011, Considine et al., 2014). 
 This research finds that accountability is closely associated with demonstrating that 
monies received have been spent in accordance with the charity’s objectives. This in turn is 
related to the implementation of appropriate systems and controls to record monies received and 
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how they are spent in furtherance of these objectives. But how this impacts on charity behaviour, 
and how it is viewed from, or operationalized at, an individual stakeholder perspective, is unclear. 
While there was broad agreement that charities are accountable to numerous stakeholders, it is 
debatable whether donors (who provide funds with no direct economic benefit to themselves) or 
beneficiaries (who are often central to both donors’ funding decisions and the charity’s mission) 
should be at the forefront of charity managers’ considerations and the discharge of 
accountability.  
 Charities have a fiduciary responsibility to account for the funds received to support their 
beneficiaries who, while having legitimacy and urgent needs, appear to lack power. In Mitchell et 
al.’s (1997) parlance, they might be considered ‘discretionary’ or ‘dependent’ stakeholders (it 
would be at charity managers’ discretion to respond to their accountability needs, or they would 
depend on the power of other stakeholders to provide leverage). However, this research finds 
that stakeholders commonly perceived as more salient, such as large donors (who have power, 
legitimacy and urgency given their ability to provide or withdraw resources), cede power and 
impute saliency to beneficiaries. In addition, charity managers, highlighting a ‘felt’ responsibility, 
often reflected on the desire to involve, and get feedback from, beneficiaries as a way of giving 
such individuals voice and sharpening service delivery. Indeed, the possible close alignment 
between donors’ and beneficiaries’ interests may result in donors acting as proxies for 
beneficiaries (especially where beneficiary involvement and feedback is difficult to obtain). This 
appears at odds with Mitchell et al.’s theory that seems to imply that stakeholders compete for 
attention. While their general propositions are likely to hold in a business setting where 
stakeholders largely act for economic reasons (a setting dominated by controlling governance 
models), they may apply significantly less, or at least in a more nuanced manner, in the charity 
sector (where ‘partnering’ models of governance are more likely and certain key stakeholders act 
for reasons other than economic benefit). 
 Notwithstanding the above, donors remain vital. Prior research indicates that frequently 
they are perceived as the most important stakeholder group in terms of accountability, both 
generally and in the context of formal communications (Hyndman, 1990; Connolly and 
Hyndman, 2013). This research also affords significant weight to donors. Interviewees (including 
beneficiaries) recognized that without donors’ financial support, charities could not operate. 
However, donors may not compete with beneficiaries for attention. While mission drift can occur 
if influential donors/funders lose sight of the mission of the charity (possibly a particular 
problem with some public sector funding – see Dacombe, 2011), this research suggests it is not 
generally the case. Often donors go to considerable lengths to support the case of beneficiaries in 
terms of encouraging their participation in decision making and in focusing on the outputs and 
impacts that accrue to beneficiaries. Although, paradoxically, while donors may encourage 
charities to seek more beneficiary engagement in decision making (and charity managers may be 
supportive of this), and there may be major benefits from such in terms of organizational 
sharpness, the interviews highlighted major difficulties in achieving this. These include the 
possibility that beneficiaries, even if they can be easily identified, may not want to engage 
(especially where service provision meets their needs) or may not have the capacity to engage.  
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 The research also identifies that if accountability is to be meaningful, it needs to be 
discharged to different stakeholders in various ways. Since many external stakeholders often rely 
on formal and informal channels of reporting to meet their information needs, the preparation 
and publication of such reports to a high standard is viewed by donors (and indeed beneficiaries) 
as important. Such can demonstrate credibility and legitimacy, ensuring financial discipline and 
maintaining focus on key performance aims (features that may act in support of beneficiary 
interest). Although this, and other, research shows that formal reports (such as annual reports) 
are not particularly engaged with by many stakeholders, often because of their technical, financial 
emphasis (particularly the case with small donors, and overwhelmingly the case with 
beneficiaries), they nevertheless enhance upward accountability.  
 Discharging accountability downwards (to beneficiaries) is more challenging. This 
research suggests that beneficiaries are predominantly interested in the services that they receive 
and primarily see accountability in this context. Greater user involvement has been promoted as a 
means of making organizations more responsive to user needs (Locke et al. 2003), and is viewed 
as desirable by stakeholders in this research. In addition, such is clearly supported by the Charity 
Commission (2000) which promotes greater representation of service users (or beneficiaries) on 
governing boards. Such moves, while potentially sharpening the mission focus of charities and 
downward accountability to beneficiaries, are difficult to achieve. However, this research suggests 
that donors are often seen (and frequently see themselves) as proxies for beneficiaries, with the 
donor regularly taking a beneficiary-focused view. To the extent that donors’ can do this, any 
potential adverse consequences of limited beneficiary involvement may be partially overcome. 
Thus, donors may act as champions of beneficiaries’ interests and reinforce their claims as salient 
stakeholders. In this respect, paradoxically, contractual motivations may not necessarily be to the 
detriment of communal accountability as powerful stakeholders exercise their influence on behalf 
of beneficiaries’ interests. Managing this apparent ‘paradox’ requires key stakeholders, particularly 
charity managers, to embrace and explore possible tensions and to achieve balance in reporting 
and in actions.  
 This research shows a desire by many stakeholders for a more holistic accountability. 
There is clear evidence that donors (salient stakeholders in the language of Mitchell et al., 1997) 
promote the claims of beneficiaries (stakeholders who may be less salient). This suggests that 
beneficiary accountability and interest are often at the heart of the giving decision. Here, the 
interplay of donor and beneficiary accountability needs and claims may bolster each other. 
Donors demanding beneficiary focus from a charity can enhance beneficiary accountability; while 
positive beneficiary experience, and information that such has been achieved, provides donors 
with assurances of mission achievement. This cycle of reinforcement, which may seem 
paradoxical in the business context in which stakeholder identification and salience theory was 
developed, and in which stakeholders often compete with one another for consideration, makes 
sense in a charity context. In such a scenario, while formal publically-available external reports 
may be important and, with some stakeholders, be a principal means of discharging 
accountability, other forms of accountability (such as direct service provision, feedback 
opportunities and representation) will be critical to beneficiaries. Ideally, the various forms of 
accountability will align and complement each other.  
 Despite the desire for a more holistic accountability, this and other research (O’Dwyer 
and Unerman, 2007; Connolly and Hyndman, 2013) has identified major difficulties (related to 
lack of resources, organizational commitment, guidance and/or expertize) in achieving 
meaningful downward accountability even when a stakeholder with seemingly significant power 
(the primary funder) advocates such. Therefore, well-intentioned desires alone are unlikely to 
bring meaningful change. Perhaps what is needed is the engagement of agents or ‘champions’ of 
change to provide encouragement (or even coercion) and guidance as to what is required. This 
might involve those concerned with the administration and control of the charity sector or 
umbrella support organizations (such as, in a UK context, the Charities Aid Foundation, New 
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Philanthropy Capital and Intelligent Giving). Without this, moves toward more meaningful 
holistic accountability will probably be restricted, resulting in a sector afforded limited 
legitimation. 
 This article offers critical insights into how charities may react to the accountability needs 
of various stakeholders. At an individual charity level, it can support improvement in 
accountability mechanisms, and thus impact and trust. What we see from this research, and what 
we identify as its main contribution, is the highlighting of the potential for cyclical reinforcing of 
stakeholder accountability interests; the paradox that as beneficiaries interests are focused upon, 
donor accountability is strengthened (and vice-versa). In a sector that needs accountability, 
legitimacy and trust in order to develop and grow, the encouragement of such complementary 
forces has the capability to provide potency or, in the famous words of Dickens which 
commenced this article, to provide the best (or at least slightly better) of all times for the charity 
sector.  
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